

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Unannounced Industrial Facility Security Audits (C)

REFERENCE: Memo to D/Sec from DCI, dated 23 Aug 78,  
subject: Surprise Inspections at  
Contractor Facilities

1. (U/AIUO) Action Requested: None; for information only.

2. (C) Background: In response to your request, the attached provides a summary of information regarding unannounced industrial facility security audits conducted by the Industrial Security Branch, Office of Security, since 1 September 1977.

Generally, among the various facilities audited, we have found security protection of our classified material to be satisfactory. The following types of deficiencies were noted at certain facilities and, in the preponderance of cases, corrective action was implemented by the contractor immediately or on a timely basis.

a. Inadequate document control procedures, including the lack of periodic inventories of classified holdings.

b. Lack of strict adherence to the Two-Person Rule.

c. Combinations to security containers were not being changed on a timely basis, and not being stored in strict compliance with established procedures.

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d. A lack of proper recording procedures relative to the destruction of certain categories of classified material.

e. Storage of classified material in non-approved containers.

f. Open-shelf storage of classified material in nonapproved areas.

f. Inadequate guard coverage.

g. Inadequate alarm check procedures and failure to upgrade alarm equipment.

h. Inadequate response time to alarms.

i. The need for additional security hardware in certain areas.

j. The need for improvement of the Security Education and Violation Programs.

k. Insufficient control of reproduction machines.

l. The need for improvement of access controls.

m. Failure to debrief employees who were no longer engaged in Agency programs.

(C) Senior management and security staffs at the facilities were most cooperative, and they evidenced a genuine interest in improving their security. Our recommendations generally have been well received by the contractors who, as indicated above, have responded quickly with respect to the implementation of the recommendations.

(C) To keep you current on the industrial security audit program, I will forward to you brief commentaries relative to audits of Agency contractor facilities as they are completed. I have also asked

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[REDACTED] to inform me of any trips you might be taking which would include visits to our contractors or meetings where our contractors would be present. We will review our files and give you a very brief resume of any significant security material.

Robert W. Gambino

Att

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1 - DDCI

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1 - ISB Subject

① - ISB Chrono

OS/PSD/ISB [REDACTED] sb (31 August 1978)

Retyped page 2, [REDACTED] sb (7 September 1978)

Retyped page 1/C/PSD:sb (16 October 1978)

Retyped Attachment per D/Security:sb (16 October 1978)

Revised/C/OPS:sb (24 October 1978)

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78-2409

23 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Surprise Inspections at Contractor Facilities

1. While I was visiting [REDACTED] last week, they mentioned a recent surprise security inspection which you conducted. They appeared pleased to have had it and pleased with their performance.

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2. I am gratified that this program is rolling along so well. I would appreciate your giving me brief after-action reports of these surprise inspections of contractors' facilities. I don't believe I should or want to get into the details in very great depth. I do not want, however, to fail to commend a contractor when his performance has been good and I happen to meet him at the Business Council or somewhere else. I also would like to have a general feel for whether what we're uncovering is poor, medium or good.

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

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cc: DDA

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Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP94B01041R000300110016-8

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Deputy Director of Security (P&M)  
4E-60 Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

OS 8 2285/A

DATE

3 November 1978

STATINTL

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DD/PTOS  
202 [REDACTED]

7 Nov '78

Charlie:

This latest version, as found in the attached folder, got all the way to the D/Security before it bounced. He asks that the following changes be made:

- ° Remove the attachments and make no reference to attached material. He suggests that some further examples of discrepancies mentioned in these attachments might be listed and incorporated into the body of the memorandum.

- ° Eliminate the phrasing in paragraph 2 which says "in the preponderance of cases, collective action...." The DCI is certain to ask "what happened in the minority of cases where such timely action was not in evidence"?

With these adjustments, the paper, which should still run no more than three pages, should fly.

K  
WRK

/br